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Abstract
The rate of information diﬀusion and consequently price discovery, is conditional upon not
only the design of the market microstructure, but also the informational structure. This paper
presents a market microstructure model showing that an increasing number of information
hierarchies among informed competitive traders leads to a slower information diﬀusion rate
and informational ineﬃciency. The model illustrates that informed traders may prefer trading
with each other rather than with noise traders in the presence of the information hierarchies.
Furthermore, we show that momentum can be generated from the predictable patterns of noise
traders, which are assumed to be a function of past prices.
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Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.The rate of information diﬀusion, and, consequently, price discovery, is conditional on not only
the design of the market microstructure, but also the informational structure. The existing ﬁnance
literature demonstrates that by polarizing traders into informed traders and noise traders, price
discovery can be very slow (see Kyle (1985)) or very fast (see Foster and Viswanathan (1993))
depending on the market microstructure.1 The goal of this paper is to understand the impact of the
informational structure on the degree of information diﬀusion ineﬃciency. We show for instance,
that even in a market where there are many informed traders, the rate of information diﬀusion can
be very slow if the information is distributed hierarchically.
Speciﬁcally, we consider a discrete time, inﬁnite trading horizon model in which traders trade
a single asset with a probability of liquidation in every period. The traders diﬀer in two ways.
First, traders are in diﬀerent information hierarchies such that traders in a higher information
hierarchy embed the informationof those in lower hierarchies. Such a hierarchy leads to a mechanism
where informed traders in a higher hierarchy may prefer trading against informed traders in lower
hierarchies. In order to trade against informed traders in lower hierarchies, a trader needs to maintain
the informational advantage by preventing the spread of the information incorporated into the price
(at a fast rate). Thus, this informational mechanism can lead to ineﬃciency in information diﬀusion.
This is more likely to happen when the number of information hierarchies increases. Second, traders
in the lowest information hierarchy, i.e., noise traders, do not receive signals about fundamentals and
trade on price direction. Thus, our setting includes the traditional stylized setting of the dichotomy
of informed traders and noise traders as a special case. When the informed traders trade with the
noise traders, they take into account the fact that noise traders trade on price direction. This can
lead to the generation of the momentum.
The informativeness of price, or the rate of the information diﬀusion, is a function of the layers
of hierarchies among informed traders for the following reasons. First, the expectation error of
the value of the underlying asset originating from the signal extraction of the partially informed
1Kyle (1985) shows that when a monopolistically informed trader strategically trades with noise traders, the
monopolist will prevent the information from being released, which in turn leads to a slower rate of information
diﬀusion. On the other hand, information is released almost instantly when informed traders possessing identical
information compete very aggressively, as analyzed in Foster and Viswanathan (1993).
1traders makes the price less informative. The accuracy of the expectation formed by the partially
informed traders decreases as the number of the layers of the hierarchies increases. This decrease in
accuracy is partly due to the fact that it is increasingly hard for the partially informed traders to
infer whether the movement in price is due to a change in fundamental value of the underlying asset
or the liquidity shock brought by noise traders.2 Second, the prevention of information disclosure
by informed traders in higher information hierarchies makes the price less informative. When the
riskiness of trading with other informed traders relative to the riskiness of trading with noise traders
decreases, the informed traders will prevent information disclosure in order to make a proﬁt from
other informed traders. We show that informed traders in higher information hierarchies are more
likely to be proﬁtable if they trade against other informed traders when the price deviates suﬃciently
far away from the fundamental value of the underlying asset and the number of information hierarchy
layers increases. As a result, the information diﬀusion is slower when the number of information
hierarchy layers among informed traders increases.
In addition, rather than assuming that the behavior of noise traders is independently and identi-
cally distributed across time, as in the standard literature, we argue that the behavioral pattern of
noise traders consists of predictable (based on price direction) and an unpredictable (idiosyncratic
liquidity shock) components. In turn, our model generates a number of interesting and testable
implications that are absent from existing models of rational noisy equilibrium. For instance, the
predictable pattern of noise traders’ behavior resulting in persistence structure in prices, regard-
less of the distributional properties of the fundamentals. In addition, interaction between informed
traders and noise traders can lead to various market liquidity levels. Perhaps the most novel feature
of our model is that the trend-following behavior pattern of noise traders can generate momentum
in returns, i.e., a positive autocorrelation in returns. One explanation comes from the self-fulﬁlling
type argument that when noise traders believe there is momentum, they will follow the trend; while
when noise traders follow the trend, momentum can be generated.
Overall, the main contributions of this paper are as follows. First, this paper proposes a frame-
2For instance, a positive innovationin the value of the underlyingasset is the observational equivalentto a shortage
of liquidity supply provided by noise traders from the perspective of the partially informed traders.
2work to study the impact of hierarchical information and the layers of hierarchy on the speed of price
discovery. We show that the speed of price discovery and the informativeness of price decrease when
the number of the information hierarchy layers increases. Second, the predictable behavior pattern
of noise traders has a signiﬁcant impact on the persistence structure of prices and returns. The
trend-following behavior pattern facilitates the formation of momentum in returns. Third, bounded
rationality of noise traders (the unpredictable component) may generate proﬁts for them when in-
formed traders believe it is too risky to trade with them and choose to trade with other informed
traders, thus providing justiﬁcation for the existence of noise traders.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, a case of two information hierarchies is
discussed where only one informed trader and noise traders are presented in the market. This model
serves as a benchmark to motivate the extensions that follow and demonstrates that the predictable
pattern of noise traders results in the persistence in prices and facilitates the formation of persistence
in returns. In addition, the trend-following behavior of noise traders can generate momentum in
returns. In section III, an information hierarchy with three levels, two types of informed traders
and noise traders, is studied. The information diﬀusion is slower compared to the benchmark case.
In section IV, a general case of N information hierarchies is investigated. The information diﬀusion
speed decreases as the number of information hierarchy levels increases. In section V, Monte Carlo
simulations are carried out to demonstrate the impact of the predictable pattern of noise traders
and of the number of hierarchical information levels. Finally, we conclude.
I. Case of Two Information Hierarchies
We begin by providing a simple version of our model without modeling the interactions between
informed traders at diﬀerent hierarchical information levels. This special case helps develop the
intuition for how the interaction between a competitive informed trader and noise traders aﬀects
the equilibrium properties and the formation of return predictability, in particular, the formation of
momentum. The benchmark case is also interesting in its own right as it provides a framework to
study how the behavior of noise traders aﬀects the equilibrium properties that can not be captured
3by existing noisy rational expectation literatures. In Section III, we extend this version to allow
for interactions between informed traders by explicitly modeling the information hierarchy among
informed traders.3
A. Financial Assets
Consider two traded assets. One is a riskless asset with a ﬁxed rate of return of 1+r. The other
asset is composed of shares or claims on a hypothetical ﬁrm, which pays no dividends but has a chance
of being liquidated every period. The probability of being liquidated in period t + 1, conditional
on the ﬁrm’s surviving until period t, is assumed to be constant λ. When liquidation happens, the
ﬁrm pays the shareholders a liquidation value Vt, which is assumed to follow a stochastic process.
Throughout the paper, we assume that Vt is Gaussian. Vt can be independently and identically
distributed (iid) or serially correlated. The normality assumption is for the purpose of simplicity as
it permits the existence of a linear equilibrium. The market price for the risky asset is Pt.
B. Game Structure
Two groups of investors, one informed trader and continuum of noise traders, trade the asset on
every trading date. At the beginning of each trading date, noise traders supply a certain amount of
the shares of the underlying asset to the market. The supply of noise traders is stochastic, which
captures the bounded rationality of noise traders. The informed trader observes the current market
price and submits his demand. The price can be adjusted upward or downward, and the informed
trader will adjust his optimal demand for the number of shares of the underlying asset accordingly.
The market clears when the demand from the informed trader equals to the supply from noise
traders.
3We borrow the basic setting from Makarov and Rytchkov (2007).
4C. Noise Traders
Traditionally, the behavior of liquidity suppliers, i.e., noise traders has been assumed in the
literature to be independently and identically distributed (iid) over time. With the purpose of
investigating the eﬀects of the interactions between noise and informed traders on the equilibrium
outcomes, we model the behavior of noise traders in a way consistent with Harris (2003). Harris
(2003) describes the noise traders as types of traders who trade based on their beliefs concerning
the price change direction rather than the fundamentals of the underlying asset. According to this
description, a typical example of noise trader is a technical trader. Technical traders trade based
on “pattern recognition” type techniques which aid in the formation of the beliefs concerning the
direction of prices.4 Therefore, we assume that there is a predictable components of the aggregate
supply of noise traders (technical traders) that should be a function of past prices. In addition,
there is an unpredictable component which captures the diﬀerence in opinions among noise traders
or technical traders. Hence, we model the aggregate supply of the shares of the underlying asset
from noise traders throughout the paper Qs
t as βPt−1+Θt, where Pt is the price of the trading asset.
βPt−1 captures the predictable component of the aggregate supply of shares from noise traders. Θt
is the iid Gaussian with mean 0 and variance σ2
Θ.5 The random component is for the purpose of
preventing prices from being fully revealing, in the spirit of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980).6
β is an aggregate measure of noise traders’ supply of shares of the underlying asset. The sign of
β indicates the aggregate response of the noise traders to the price change direction. For instance,
if β<0, noise traders will sell the traded asset when the unit price is negative (price is decreasing).
It seems that the noise traders behave as if they follow the trend of the price. We label noise traders
with negative β “trend followers”. In contrast, if β>0, noise traders will sell the trading asset
when the unit change of price of the traded asset is positive (price is increasing), i.e., noise traders
4There are two diﬀerent types of technical analysis: subjective and objective analysis. Subjectiveanalysis captures
the fact that diﬀerent traders may come up with diﬀerent conclusions based on the same information set due to
subjective judgments or priors. Even in objective analysis, diﬀerent traders may have diﬀerent conﬁdence levels or
tolerance levels which lead to diﬀerent trading decisions.
5The mean is not necessarily 0. It could be a positive number with a large magnitude, which would guarantee that
noise traders always supply a positive number of shares. The zero mean assumption could be interpreted as demeaned
supply.
6The predictable component is speciﬁed for simplicity, although it is easy to extend our analysis to allow for many
price lags without changing our main results.
5act against the trend of the price, and we label the noise traders with positive β “contrarians”.
The magnitude of β measures the sensitivity of noise traders to price direction changes. The larger
the magnitude of β, the more sensitive noise traders are to the changes in price direction. That
is, if the magnitude of β is large, with a small change of price, noise traders adjust their holdings
of the underlying asset to a large extent. The magnitude of β can be interpreted as the aggregate
number of noise traders present in the market as well. β could be time-varying. Throughout this
paper, however, we do not intend to model the evolution of noise traders and assume β to be a
time invariant parameter. We will elaborate more on the relationship between β and equilibrium
properties later.
D. Informed Traders
In this benchmark model, we only consider a single informed investor. In each trading period t,
the investor receives a signal St about the fundamental value of the underlying asset Vt:
St = Vt + bsηt (1)
where ηt ∼ iidN(0,1). bs is the standard deviation of the signal and 1/b2
s is the precision of the
signal. The signal is more informative when bs decreases. The investor is assumed to have a mean-
variance preference, i.e., E(Wt)− 1
2δVar(Wt), where Wt is his wealth level at t and δ is the preference
parameter. When δ = 0, the traders are risk neutral, and when δ increases, the traders become more
risk averse. In order to obtain a closed-form solution, we use myopic preference to abstract away
from dynamic hedging considerations.7 Let Qt+1 be excess return, i.e.,
Qt+1 = λVt+1 +( 1− λ)Pt+1 − (1 + r)Pt (2)
where λVt+1 +(1−λ)Pt+1 is the expected return from the holding of one share of the trading asset
and (1 + r)Pt is the opportunity cost of holding. Therefore, the per period utility maximization
7Myopic preferenceis a simplifying assumption, and its main purpose is to obtain an analyticallytractablesolution.








where Ft is the information set available for informed traders that contains the current price, the
history of past prices, and all the received signals, that is, Ft = {Pt,P t−1,...,P 0,S t,S t−1,...,S 0},
and Xt is the holding of the informed investor at trading period t. For the expositional purposes, we
use Et[.]=E[.|Ft] throughout the paper. Hence, the optimal demand of the shares of the underlying





Let ωt = 1
δV art[Qt+1] so that Xt = ωtEt[Qt+1]. Thus, the informed trader adjusts his holding of the
risky asset proportional to the expected return from the holdings. The risk averse coeﬃcient aﬀects
the proportion of the informed trader’s investment in the risky asset. When δ = 0, the optimal
holding Xt is not well-deﬁned for Et[Qt+1] 6= 0, and Xt could be any amount for Et[Qt+1]=0 .
Namely, if the informed trader is risk-neutral, he would like to borrow an inﬁnite amount of money
to invest in the risky asset if its expected return is greater than zero. He will spend any portion
of his wealth on the risky asset if its expected return is equal to zero because the risky asset is
indiﬀerent from the riskless asset in this case. Similarly, when δ increases, the trader becomes more
risk averse; he will invest less and less of his wealth into the risky asset. In particular, if δ = ∞,h e
will not invest any of his wealth into risky asset.
E. Equilibrium
We focus on stationary and linear expectation equilibrium, where Vart[Qt+1] is constant such
that ωt = 1
δVart[Qt+1] = ω is time invariant and there is no bubble in prices. Hence Xt = ωEt[Qt+1].










Et[λVt+1 +( 1− λ)Pt+1] (4)
Deﬁning P ∗








Et[λVt+1 +( 1− λ)P ∗
t+1]
where ρ solves:
(1 − λ)ρ2 +( 1+r)ρ + β =0 . (5)
The detailed derivation is given in Appendix. Iterating Equation 5 forward and invoking the no-
bubble constraint, i.e., limj→∞(1−λ




































Equation 6 shows that the equilibrium price at time t is the sum of three terms. The ﬁrst term
incorporates the predictable pattern of noise traders’ behavior. As shown in Equation 5, the serial
correlation structure of prices (ρ) is a function of the predictable pattern of noise traders’ behav-
ior (β). Intuitively, because the informed trader understands that the predictable pattern of the
aggregate supply from the noise traders is a function of past prices, he can forecast the mean of
the aggregate supply from the noise traders. Thus, the trader can form a better forecast of the
price in the next period by taking into account this information, which will help increase his proﬁt.
As a result, the price in the next period is correlated with the past prices, which generates the
8serial correlation. As demonstrated in a later section, this serial correlation in prices brought by
the predictable pattern in noise traders’ behavior generates a serial correlation in returns as well.
Therefore, the momentum could be generated. Notice that this result is independent of the as-
sumption of the fundamental value of the underlying asset. We will elaborate more on this in later
sections. The second term compensates for the risks for informed traders, which originate from the
non-predictable component of aggregate noise traders’ behavior. The third term is the expected
payoﬀ of asset holdings.
F. Equilibrium Properties
Stationary Equilibrium
We then study the conditions for the equilibrium price to be stationary. We rewrite Equation 5
as










Notice that in Equation 7, the right hand side (RHS) is assumed to be covariance stationary and has
ﬁnite variance given the stationary assumption of Vt. Therefore, the price is covariance stationary
when |ρ| < 1. Formally,
Proposition 1 The relationship between the stationarity of equilibrium and β can be summarized
as follows:
1. When noise traders are trend followers (β<0), the maximum number of stationary equilibria
is 1. Formally, there exist a stationary equilibrium if and only if the probability of liquidation
is not suﬃciently large (λ<β+ r +2 ).
2. When noise traders are contrarians and not sensitive to price direction change (1+r
2 >β>0)
and the probability of liquidation is suﬃciently large (λ>β− r), there is a unique stationary
equilibrium. However, if the probability of liquidation is not suﬃciently large, (λ<β− r),
there exists two stationary equilibria.
93. When noise traders are contrarians and they are sensitive to price direction change (β>1+r
2 )
and if the probability of liquidation is suﬃciently small (λ<1+r
2 ), there exist two stationary
equilibria. Additionally, if λ>β− r, there is a unique equilibrium. Otherwise, if 1+r
2 <λ<
β − r, there is no stationary equilibrium.
Proposition 1 suggests that the predictable component β and the probability of liquidation λ
play important roles in determining of the stationarity of the equilibrium price process. As shown in
Proposition 1, the equilibrium can be stationary only if the liquidation probability is not large. This
result is consistent with the observation that when the probability of being liquidated in the following
period is very large, an informed trader is reluctant to adjust the optimal holding in response to the
short run proﬁtable opportunity originating from the trading pattern of noise traders. When the
probability of liquidation is small, the riskiness of exploiting the short run proﬁtable opportunity
from noise traders is relatively low. In that case, the informed trader may be more willing to adjust
his holding accordingly. Therefore, the market will be cleared because the demand from the informed
trader will match the supply from noise traders. Therefore, a stationary equilibrium can exist only
if the probability of liquidation is suﬃciently low.
Momentum
Momentum is deﬁned as the rate of acceleration of a security’s price or volume in technical
analysis terms. Once a momentum trader sees an acceleration ina stock’s price, earnings, or revenues,
the trader will often take a long or short position in the stock with the hope that its momentum
will continue in either an upward or downward direction. This strategy relies more on short-term
movements in price rather than on the fundamental value of companies. Jegadeesh and Titman
(1993) show that the momentum trading strategy can generate abnormal proﬁt. Since its discovery,
momentum has been one of the most resilient anomalies challenging the market eﬃciency hypothesis.
It is well known that any theory seeking to explain momentum should be able to generate positive
serial correlations in returns. In this section, we investigate the ability of our model to generate
momentum, and particularly the positive autocorrelation in returns.
10We consider two speciﬁcations of Vt. To start, we assume Vt are iid with Et[Vt+s]=µ. Hence,
Equation 6 becomes







Equation 8 demonstrates that if|ρ| < 1, Pt followsan autoregressive (AR) (1) process and Corr[Pt,P t−s]=
ρs follows directly. Deﬁning return as the diﬀerence between the price levels, i.e., rt = Pt − Pt−1,
we have




Equation 9 shows that given |ρ| < 1, returns follow an autoregressive moving average model
(ARMA)(1,1) process with mean 0. It can further be shown that Corr[rt,r t−1]=ρ2 + ρ − 1.







2 , the returns display a positive autocorrelation at ﬁrst lag, i.e., momentum
is generated.8
The result of positive serial correlations in returns provides a rational explanation of momentum.
From Proposition 1, if we restrict ourselves to stationary equilibrium, the only possible scenario
resulting in positive serial correlations in returns is when ρ is positive which corresponds to β<0
and λ<β+r+2 case. This suggests that it is only possible in our model to generate a momentum
anomaly when noise traders behave like trend followers. This is consistent with a self-fulﬁlling
explanation. The reason why noise traders behaves like trend-followers is because the momentum
anomaly exists, and when noise traders behaves like trend-followers, the momentum anomaly can
be generated.
Next, we consider Vt to be a stationary AR(1) process. That is, Vt = aVt−1 + bv￿t, where ￿t
are iid standard normals, bv is the inverse of the square root of the precision of the innovations,
and a<1. When bv increases, the precision of the signal decreases; that is, the Vt becomes noisier.




2 . Combined with the annual risk free rate r =0 .03 and liquidation probability λ = 10%, we need to have
β<−1.
11Then Et[Vt+s]=asVt. Hence





1+r − (1 − λ)a
(10)
Deﬁning return as the diﬀerence in price, i.e., rt = Pt − Pt−1, we have:





1+r − a(1 − λ)
∆Vt, (11)





ω2(1 + r)2 +
λ2a2
(1 + r − a(1 − λ))2Var[Vt−1] (12)
We are still able to generate positive serial correlations in returns when ρ>0. From Proposi-
tion 1, when noise traders are trend-followers, the ρ can be positive and momentum can exist. In
addition, even if ρ is negative, it is still possible for momentum to exist as long as the right hand
side (RHS) of Equation 12 is positive. In other words, if the fundamental value of the underlying
asset is serially correlated, the momentum could exist regardless of the behavior pattern of the noise
traders.
What if There is no Pattern in Noise Traders’ Behavior?
To illustrate of the beneﬁts of the assumption that there is a predictable component in noise
traders’ behavior, i.e. βPt−1, we investigate the case where there is no predictable pattern in noise
traders’ behavior, i.e., β = 0. That is, the liquidity supply from noise traders is Θt, where Θt is
iid normal. This is consistent with the standard assumption about noise traders’ behavior in the











12This shows that the statistical properties of prices are fully determined by the statistical properties
of the fundamental value of the underlying asset in the absence of the predictable pattern in noise
traders’ behavior. Hence, the extra gains from the assumption of a predictable pattern in noise
traders’ behavior can be summarized as follows:
1. The assumption of a predictable pattern, i.e., β 6= 0, results in persistence in price regardless
of the statistical assumption of fundamentals. On the contrary, if there is no predictable
pattern, i.e., β = 0, the persistence structure in price depends on the statistical assumption of
fundamentals. With the presence of the predictable pattern in noise traders’ behavior, price
is persistent even when Vt is iid. The persistence in prices is partly due to the fact that
the informed trader adjusts his optimal holding based on the expectation of the predictable
pattern in the noise traders’ behavior. This predictable pattern in noise traders’ behavior
preserves the correlation structure of prices across time. The persistence in prices is also due
to the fact that the noise traders utilize the information concerning past prices to adjust their
position, which determines the price in the current period. This feedback mechanism can
also help the formation of the persistence structure in prices. On the contrary, if there is no
predictable pattern in noise traders’ behavior, the equilibrium price is entirely determined by
the distributional assumption of fundamentals, i.e., Vt. To see this, from Equation 13 we can
demonstrate that if Vt is iid, Pt is iid.I fVt is an AR(1) process, then Pt is an AR(1) process.
2. The assumption of a predictable pattern, i.e., β 6= 0, generates momentum (the positive
serial correlation in returns), while if there is no predictable pattern, i.e., β = 0, momentum
cannot be generated in our model. When there is no predictable pattern in noise traders’
behavior, generally, asymmetric information cannot generate momentum alone. Intuitively,
rational traders require higher compensation for holding a larger amount of the risky asset.
This leads to a positive relationship between returns in the next period and the supply from
noise traders. In the meantime, there is a negative relationship between price and the supply
from noise traders. Recall that return in this period is the diﬀerence between prices. If supply
13is assumed to be iid, realized returns are negatively correlated.9 On the contrary, when there
is a predictable pattern in noise traders’ behavior, as indicated earlier, momentum or positive
serial correlation in returns can be generated in our model. Notice that there are two opposing
eﬀects that generate momentum. One is the negative slope in the demand curve of informed
traders and the other one is trend-followingbehavior of noise traders. We show that under some
parameters values, the noise traders’ trend following behavior may dominate the downward
demand curve eﬀects, which generates a positive serial correlation in returns and provides an
explanation for the existence of momentum.
II. Case of Three Information Hierarchies
We now extend the simple model of the previous section to allow for the interaction of informed
traders at diﬀerent hierarchical information levels. We consider two types of informed traders,
corresponding to two informational hierarchical levels. To obtain a closed form solution, we further
simplify the setting. Assume there are two factors that jointly determine the fundamental values
of the underlying asset. That is, Vt is a function of the two factors V 1
t and V 2
t . For simplicity,
we assume that the function is linear, i.e., Vt = V 1
t + V 2
t . In addition, we assume that there is no
noise in the signals. Namely, a type 1 trader (fully informed trader) receives two signals per period,
S1,t = V 1
t and S2,t = V 2
t . A Type 2 trader (partially informed trader) receives only one signal
S2,t = V 2
t . Furthermore, we assume that V 1
t and V 2
t are AR(1) processes, i.e., V 1
t = aV 1
t−1 + bV ￿1
t
and V 2
t = aV 2
t−1 + bV ￿2
t.
The information set for the type 2 trader is F2,t = {Pt,P t−1,... , V 2
t ,V2
t−1,... }, and the informa-




t−1,... }. By construction,
F2,t ⊂ F1.t, and it captures the idea of a hierarchical information structure. It is well known from the
existing literature on forecasting the forecasts of others, the inﬁnite regress problem can be avoided
with a hierarchical information structure. Intuitively, a fully informed trader knows everything a
partially informed trader knows. Therefore, a fully informed trader knows exactly the expectation
9Cov[Qt,r t] → Cov[Θt,P t − Pt−1] = Cov[Θt,P t] < 0.
14formed by a partially informed trader on the signal received by the fully informed trader. Then
the inﬁnite regress problem collapses.10 Formally, the three information hierarchies’ equilibrium is
characterized as:
Proposition 2 If a type 1 trade observes V 1
t and V 2
t and a type 2 trader only observes V 2
t , the
equilibrium price is
Pt = ρPt−1 + PV Vt + PΘΘt + P∆(b V 1









ρΩ + a(1 − λ)
P∆ = −





ρ + aω1(1 − λ)c
where b V 1
t = E[V 1
t |F2,t], Ω=ω1 + ω2, ω1 = Var[Qt+1|F1,t], ω2 = Var[Qt+1|F2,t], and where ρ solves
(1 − λ)Ωρ








ρΩ + a(1 + λ)
+ P∆)2 =0









t−1) − bV c￿
1
t + kPΘΘt
10It is well known that when a hierarchical information structure exists, the fully informed traders can infer the
exact expectations of the partially informed traders. Then signal extraction problem between these traders can be
characterized by a ﬁnite number of the state variables that include the expectations of the partially informed traders.
If there is no hierarchical information structure, the signal extraction problem needs to be characterized by an inﬁnite
number of the states variables that include the inﬁnite iteration of expectation among traders, for instance, trader
A’s expectation of trader B’s expectation, trader B’s expectation of trader A’s expectation of trader B’s expectation,
and so on.





Proposition 2 shows that the equilibrium price in the case of three informationhierarchies consists
of four terms, instead of three terms as in the case of two information hierarchies . The extra term is
P∆(b V 1
t −V 1
t ), which captures the expectation error of type 2 traders in guessing the signal received
by type 1 traders. That is, the forecasting behavior of type 2 traders adds noise to the equilibrium
price. Further, as shown in Proposition 2, the expectation error follows an AR(1) process and is
thus persistent.
Intuitively, the persistent structure in prices leads to a slower information diﬀusion rate. If there
is no persistent structure in prices, the innovation in fundamentals can be incorporated immediately.
But when prices are persistent, the innovation in fundamentals can have long lasting eﬀects so that
the prices can not immediately be adjusted to reﬂect the fundamental value of the underlying asset.
The persistent structure is due to the combined eﬀects of persistent structure through the predictable
pattern in noise traders and the persistent expectation errors formed by partially informed traders.
Thus, we label the former eﬀect the “beta eﬀect” and the latter the “hierarchical eﬀect”. We will
continue to investigate the roles of these two eﬀects on the information diﬀusion rate in the next
section.
A. Information Diﬀusion Rate
As mentioned earlier, the persistent structure in prices leads to a slower information diﬀusion
rate. The slower information diﬀusion rate comes from two sources: the “beta eﬀect” and the
“hierarchical eﬀect”.
Beta eﬀect
To study the role of the predictable pattern of noise traders’ behavior in generating a slower
informationdiﬀusion rate, we abstract from the hierarchical informationsetting. That is, we consider
the two information hierarchical levels case. Without loss of generality, we restrict ourselves to the
AR speciﬁcation of fundamental evolution, i.e., Vt = aVt−1+bv￿t, where ￿t are iid standard normals,
16bv is the inverse of the square root of the precision of the innovations, and a<1. As bv increases,
the Vt becomes noisier. Then Et[Vt+s]=asVt. Hence
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To demonstrate a slower information diﬀusion rate, we show that the impulse response in prices to
an innovation in liquidity shocks brought by noise traders, i.e., in Θt, is larger. Intuitively, when
there is an innovation in fundamentals, if the impulse response of prices is larger, it will take a longer
time for prices to “settle down”. That is, the information diﬀusion rate is slower.
Lemma 3 The information diﬀusion rate is slower if there is a predictable pattern in noise traders’
behavior.
Proof: If there is no predictable pattern in noise traders’ behavior, i.e., β = 0, the impulse response








for t =0 ,1,... . Notice that IRt ≥ 0 for all t. Meanwhile, if there is a predictable pattern in noise
traders’ behavior, i.e., β 6= 0, the impulse response of prices to an innovation in the fundamental









17for t =0 ,1,... . It is easy to see that IR2
t − IR1
t = ρIR2
t−1 > 0 for all t ≥ 0. That is, the impulse
response in prices to an innovation in liquidity shocks is greater when β 6= 0 than when β =0 .
IR2
t >I R 1
t for all t implies that the diﬀerence between the current price and equilibrium price is
smaller when β = 0. Therefore, it takes less time for price to converge in the case where noise traders
do not have predictable pattern, i.e., β = 0. In other words, the information diﬀusion rate is slower
if there is a predictable pattern in noise traders’ behavior.
Q.E.D
Lemma 3 shows that the existence of a predictable pattern in noise traders’ behavior leads to
a slower information diﬀusion rate. The slower information diﬀusion rate is due to the fact that
informed traders make trading decisions taking into account the predictable pattern in noise traders’
behavior that generates the persistent structure in prices.
In addition, we investigate the deviation of prices from the fundamental value of the underlying
asset due to the existence of the predictable pattern in noise traders’ behavior. If the deviation is
diﬀerent than zero persistently, then the information is incorporated into prices at a slower rate.
Formally, if there is no predictable pattern in noise traders’ behavior, i.e., β = 0, there is no
deviation of prices from the fundamental value of the underlying asset because of the complete
market. That is, when β = 0, the price in every period fully reﬂects the fundamental value of
the underlying asset. Meanwhile, if there is a predictable pattern in noise traders’ behavior, i.e.,
β 6= 0, as shown in Equation 14, the price in every period deviates from the fundamental value of
the underlying asset. The deviation is
Dt = ρPt−1 (18)
for t =0 ,1,... . It is easy to see that Dt > 0 for all t. That is, the predictable pattern in noise
traders’ behavior leads to deviation of prices from the fundamental value of the underlying asset.
The information about the fundamental value of the underlying asset, i.e., innovation in Vt,i s
incorporated into the price at a longer horizon. It also takes prices a longer time to adjust to
account for the innovation in fundamental value of the underlying asset.
18Hierarchical Eﬀect
This section study the role of hierarchical information levels in generating a slower information
diﬀusion rate. To isolate the beta eﬀect brought by the predictable pattern in noise traders’ behavior,
we impose β = 0 in this part.
Proposition 4 The information diﬀusion rate is slower in the case of three information hierarchies
than in the case of two information hierarchies.
Proof: Formally, the three information hierarchies’ equilibrium when β = 0 is characterized as: If a
type 1 trader observes V 1
t and V 2
t and a type 2 trader only observes V 2
t , the equilibrium price is
Pt = PV Vt + PΘΘt + P∆(b V 1
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The expectation errors follow an AR(1) process:
b V 1
t − V 1
t = ac(b V 1
t−1 − V 1
t−1) − bV c￿1
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∆ > 0. The impulse response of prices to an
innovation in liquidity shocks of the underlying asset IR3
t is
IR3




Θ for t>0 (20)
Notice that because shocks in the supply by noise traders, i.e., the innovations in Θt, aﬀect the price
persistently because that they are incorporated into the persistent expectation errors formed by the
partially informed trader. It takes time for the partially informed traders to learn that liquidity
shocks are irrelevant to the fundamental value of the underlying asset. Thus, it takes prices a longer
time to adjust to the shocks in supply by noise traders and the information diﬀusion rate is slower.
Q.E.D
We further investigate the deviation of prices from the fundamental value of the underlying
asset due to the existence of the predictable pattern in noise traders’ behavior. If the deviation is
consistently non-zero, then the information is incorporated into prices at a slower rate.
Formally, if there is no predictable pattern in noise traders’ behavior, i.e., β = 0, there is no
deviation of prices from the fundamental value of the underlying asset because of the complete
market. That is, when β = 0, the price in every period fully reﬂects the fundamental value of the
underlying asset. Meanwhile, with three hierarchical information levels, the price in every period








for t =0 ,1,... . It is easy to see that Dt > 0 for all t. That is, the case of three informationhierarchies
leads to the deviation of prices from the fundamental value of the underlying asset. The information
about the fundamental value of the underlying asset, i.e., innovation in Vt, is incorporated into the
20price at a longer horizon. Therefore, it also takes prices a longer time to adjust to the innovation in
fundamental value of the underlying asset.
B. Stationary Equilibrium
Similar to the case of two information hierarchies, there are two possible values of ρ for the
equilibrium. Solving the roots explicitly, we have
ρ1,2 =
(1 + r) ±
q









t ). The right hand side (RHS)
of the equation is assumed to be stationary and has ﬁnite variance given the stationary assumption
of Vt. Therefore, the price is stationary when |ρ| < 1. Formally,
Proposition 5 The relationship between the stationarity of equilibrium and β can be summarized
as follows:
1. When noise traders are contrarians, the maximum number of stationary equilibria is 1. For-
mally, there exist a unique stationary equilibrium if and only if the probability of liquidation is
not suﬃciently large (λ<2+r −
β
Ω).
2. When noise traders are trend followers and they are not too sensitive to price direction changes
(−
Ω(1+r)
2 <β<0), and if the probability of liquidation is not suﬃciently large (λ<−r −
β
Ω),
two stationary equilibria exist. Otherwise, if liquidation is suﬃciently large (λ>−r −
β
Ω),
there exists a unique stationary equilibrium.
3. When noise traders are contrarians and they are sensitive to price direction changes (β<
−
Ω(1+r)
2 ), and the probability of liquidation is suﬃciently large (−r−
β
Ω <λ , there is a unique
stationary equilibrium. If the probability of liquidation is suﬃciently small (λ< 1−r
2 ), there
are two stationary equilibria. Otherwise, i.e., 1−r
2 <λ<−r −
β
Ω, there is no stationary
equilibrium.
21Proposition 5 suggests that in addition to the number of equilibria, the predictable pattern
of noise traders’ behavior can aﬀect the stationarity of the equilibrium price process as well. It
is interesting to note that the impact of the predictable pattern of noise traders’ behavior aﬀects
the stationarity of the equilibrium price process in a diﬀerent way. For instance, in the case of
two information hierarchies, when noise traders are trend-followers, there can be two stationary
equilibria, while at most one equilibrium can exist in the case of three information hierarchies when
noise traders are trend-followers.
C. Persistent Prices
Proposition 2 allows us to calculate the correlation structure of prices explicitly. It can be shown






















This demonstrates that there are two sources of noise in the price. One is the random (unpredictable)
behavior of noise traders, and the other is from the expectation errors of partially informed trader.
Notice that if the noise traders’ behavior becomes noisier, i.e., σΘ increases, the variance of expec-
tation errors of the partially informed trader also increases. Intuitively, partially informed trader
will try to distinguish the eﬀects of noise traders’ behavior and of the signals of the fully informed
trader on prices. Because noise traders’ behavior does not reveal any information on fundamental
value of the underlying asset, it is not helpful in forming expectations of the fundamental value of
the underlying asset. If the behavior of noise traders becomes noisier, it is harder for the partially
informed traders to extract useful information on fundamentals. The partially informed trader will
make greater errors in forming expectations of fundamental value of the underlying asset, which also
leads to a noisier market price.
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ρΩ + a(1 + λ))2)+P 2
∆(ac)s
This shows that the prices are more persistent compared to the case of two informationhierarchies
because of the additionalcorrelation structure brought about by the expectation errors, i.e., P 2
∆(ac)2.
D. Return Predictability
The return is deﬁned by the diﬀerence in prices, i.e., rt = Pt−Pt−1. From Proposition 2, return
is
rt = ρrt−1 −
aλ
β




∆Θt + P∆∆(b V 1
t − V 1
t ), (23)
where ∆Vt = Vt − Vt−1,∆ Θ t =Θ t − Θt−1 and ∆(b V 1
t − Vt)=(b V 1
t − V 1
t ) − (b V 1
t−1 − V 1
t−1).
Notice that the statistical structure of returns is determined by the statistical properties of ∆Vt,
∆Θt, and ∆(b V 1
t − Vt), which correspond to evolution of the fundamental value of underlying asset,
noise traders’ behavior, and expectation errors. Notice that ∆Vt follows an ARMA(1,1) process,
∆(b V 1
t − Vt) follows an ARMA(1,1) process and ∆Θt follows a MA(1) process. Formally,
∆Vt = Vt − Vt−1 = a(Vt−1 − Vt−2)+bV (￿t − ￿t−1)=a∆Vt−1 + bV (￿t − ￿t−1)
∆(b V 1
t − Vt)=ac(∆(b V 1
































t − Vt),∆(b V 1
t−s − Vt−s)] (25)
This shows that there is a serial correlation structure in returns. Moreover, it is possible to generate
momentum, i.e., a positive correlation in returns, under certain parameter values.
In this section, we investigate the impact of interaction between informed traders at diﬀerent
information hierarchies, namely, the fully informed trader and partially informed trader, on equi-
librium properties. We show that compared to the case of two information hierarchies, the market
price contains an extra term, which is the expectation error originating from signal extraction by
the partially informed trader and adding noise to the market price. This leads to a slower infor-
mation diﬀusion rate. The slower information diﬀusion rate is due to the combined eﬀects of the
“beta” eﬀect (the persistence structure brought by the predictable pattern in noise traders’ behav-
ior) and the “hierarchical eﬀect” (the extra noise brought by the signal extraction behavior of the
partially informed trader). Therefore, the increasing number of information hierarchies decreases
the information diﬀusion rate. That is, when there is an innovation in the fundamental value of
the underlying asset, it takes a longer time for the market price to incorporate the innovation and
reﬂects the fundamental value of the underlying asset. Furthermore, prices become more persistent.
The extra persistence is also due to the persistence in the expectation errors made by the partially
informed trader, which are due to the persistence of the belief updating. In addition, momentum
in returns can be generated as well. Two sources contribute to the formation of momentum. First,
as in the case of two information hierarchies, the predictable pattern of noise traders’ behavior can
aid in the formation of momentum via the self-fulﬁlling mechanism. Second, the autocorrelations in
expectation errors can contribute to the momentum as well.
III. Case of N Information Hierarchies
We extend the Case of three information hierarchies to allow for N information hierarchies to
study the impact of increasing the number of information hierarchies. Intuitively, with increasing
number of information hierarchies, the fully informed traders may want to trade with the traders
24in lower information hierarchies. This is because it is possible that the riskiness of trading with
the partially informed traders is lower than trading with noise traders because the riskiness orig-
inating from the unpredictable pattern of their behavior may be relatively larger. Formally, we
assume there are N factors determining the fundamental value of the underlying asset in a linear




t . In addition, we assume that there is no noise in signals for all types
of traders, and the type i informed trader observes V i
t ,...,VN−1
t . Assume Vt is an AR(1) pro-
cess, i.e., V n
t = aV n
t−1 + bV ￿n
t for n =1 ,2,...,N− 1. The information set for a type i trader is
Fi,t = {Pt,P t−1,...,Vi
t ,Vi
t−1,...,VN−1
t ,... }. By construction, Fi,t ⊂ Fj.t if i>j .
Proposition 6 If a type i informed trader observes V i
t ,...,V
N−1
t , for i =1 ,2,...,N − 1. The
equilibrium price is
Pt = ρPt−1 + PV Vt + PΘΘt + P∆1(b V 1
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The expectation errors from type 2 traders follow an AR(1) process:
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1. Observational equivalence of informed traders in higher information hierarchies. Notice that,
the noise traders’ behavior only aﬀects the type 2 trader (the partially informed trader in
second highest information hierarchy) directly. Partially informed traders in other information
hierarchies need to distinguish more than two sources of randomness, and they only have
the market price as an identifying instrument. One interesting result in this setting is that
the forecasting of the signals owned by the trader in a higher hierarchy collapses. Formally,
E[E[V s
t |Fj,t]|Fi,t]=E[V s
t |Fi,t], which follows directly from the law of iterated expectation. It
simply states that the traders’ best guess in lower hierarchies concerning the signal received
by the traders in higher hierarchies is their own expectation of the fundamental value of the
underlying asset. This suggests that traders in lower information hierarchies simply cannot
26distinguish the traders in higher information hierarchies, implying that all traders in higher
information hierarchies are observationally equivalent in the perspective of a trader in a lower
hierarchy.
2. Traders in higher information hierarchies may want to trade with informed traders in lower
information hierarchies. Intuitively, the fully informed trader knows the optimal trading deci-
sions of any partially informed traders in lower hierarchies. Therefore, there is only one type
of risk if the fully informed trader wants to trade with the partially informed traders, which
originates from the probability of being liquidated. Meanwhile, in addition to the liquidation
risk, the fully informed trader faces extra risk when he wants to trade with noise traders,
which is due to unpredictable part of noise traders’ behavior. In other words, it may be more
proﬁtable for the fully informed trader to trade with the partially informed traders rather noise
traders. It can be shown that under certain parameter values, the fully informed trader will
trade against the partially informed traders rather than noise traders. We will elaborate more
on it in a later section.
3. The rationale for the presence of noise traders. Following the analysis above, when traders
with an informational advantage choose not to trade with noise traders, noise traders could
make a proﬁt. The conventional wisdom that noise traders could not make a proﬁt in the long
run dictates that informed traders have the informational advantages and do at least well as
noise traders. However, in our model, informed traders may prefer trading among themselves
rather than trade against noise traders. This may lead to proﬁts for noise traders even in the
long run. Thus, the presence of noise traders on the market is justiﬁed.
A. Information Diﬀusion Rate
Similar to the case of three information hierarchies, the persistent structure in prices leads to a
slower information diﬀusion rate. The slower information diﬀusion rate is due to two sources: the
“beta eﬀect” and the “hierarchical eﬀect”, as in the case of three information hierarchies. The “beta
eﬀect” works similar to that in the case of three informational hierarchies and we restrict ourselves
27to the study of the “hierarchical eﬀect”. In Particular, we want to study the relationship between
information diﬀusion rate and the number of information hierarchies.
Hierarchical Eﬀect
This section studies the roles of the number of information hierarchies in generating a slower
information diﬀusion rate. To isolate the beta eﬀect brought by the predictable pattern in noise
traders’ behavior, we impose β = 0 in this section.
Proposition 7 The information diﬀusion rate slows as the number of information hierarchies in-
creases.
Proof: Formally, the N information hierarchies equilibrium when β = 0 is characterized as: If a type
i informed trader observes V i
t ,...,V
N−1
t , for i =1 ,2,...,N− 1. The equilibrium price is
Pt = P 00
V Vt + P 00
ΘΘt + P 00
∆1(b V 1
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28for s =1 ,
P 00
∆1 =
aω2(λ +( 1− λ)P 00
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The expectation errors from type 2 traders follow AR(1) process:
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It is easy to see that P 00
V > 0.









Θ for t>0 (26)
Notice that liquidity shocks, i.e., the innovations in Θt, aﬀect the price persistently because that the
shocks in supply by noise traders are incorporated into persistent expectation errors formed by the
partially informed traders. It takes time for the partially informed traders to learn that the changes
in prices are due to shocks in supply and are irrelevant to the fundamental value of the underlying
asset. Thus, it takes prices a longer time to adjust to account for the shocks in supply of noise
29traders and the information diﬀusion rate is slower.
Q.E.D
Further, we investigate the deviation of prices from the fundamental value of the underlying asset due
to the existence of the predictable pattern in noise traders’ behavior. If the deviation is consistently
non-zero, the information is incorporated into prices at a slower rate.
Formally, if there is no predictable pattern in noise traders’ behavior, i.e., β = 0, there is no
deviation of prices from the fundamental value of the underlying asset because of the complete
market. That is, when β = 0, the price in every period fully reﬂects the fundamental value of
the underlying asset. Meanwhile, with N hierarchical information levels, the price in every period
deviates from the fundamental value of the underlying asset. The deviation is
Dt = P∆1(b V 1













for t =0 ,1,... . It is easy to see that Dt > 0 for all t. That is, the case of N information
hierarchies leads to deviation of prices from the fundamental value of the underlying asset. That
is, the information about the fundamental value of the underlying asset, i.e., innovation in Vt is
incorporated into the price at a longer horizon. In addition, as the number of information hierarchies
increases, the deviation could be even larger because of the existence of the expectation errors formed
by all partially informed traders.
B. Trading Among Informed Traders
As mentioned earlier, the traders in higher information hierarchies may want to trade against the
traders in lower information hierarchies. To illustrate, let us consider the case of three information
hierarchies. As shown in Appendix A, the demand from the fully informed trader is
ω1(((1 − λ)ρ − (1 + r))Pt +( λ +( 1− λ)PV )aVt +( 1− λ)P∆E[(b V 1
t+1 − V 1
t+1)|F1,t] (28)
30while the demand from the partially informed trader is
ω2(((1 − λ)ρ − (1 + r))Pt +( λ +( 1− λ)PV )a(b V 1
t + V 2
t )) (29)
where b V 1
t = a(1 − k(PV − P∆))b V 1
t−1 + k(PV − P∆)V 1
t + kPΘΘt.
Consider a scenario where there is a supply shock and no change in the fundamental value of
the underlying asset, such that noise traders choose to supply more, i.e., ∆Θt > 0. Although there
is no change in the fundamental value of the underlying asset, both types of informed traders will
adjust their optimal demands accordingly. Notice that partially informed traders will adjust their
expectations of the fundamental value of the asset downward, due to the fact that they cannot
distinguish the decrease in fundamental value of the underlying asset from a positive supply shock.
Hence, the quantity of adjustment for partially informed traders is (λ +( 1− λ)PV )akPΘ∆Θt and
for fully informed traders is (1 − λ)P∆E[(b V 1
t+1 − V 1
t+1)|F1,t].
As indicated earlier in Proposition 2, the expectation error is an AR(1) process and thus per-
sistent. Therefore, from the perspective of the fully informed trader, the expectation error should
have the same signs for time t and time t +1 .
If PΘ < 0 and thus (λ +( 1− λ)PV)akPΘ < 0, partially informed traders will choose to decrease
their optimal demand by mistakenly believing that the fundamental value of the asset decreases.
This is simply because they cannot distinguish the decrease in fundamental value in the underlying
asset from the a positive supply shock. On the other hand, when P∆ < 0 and thus (1 − λ)P∆ < 0,
fully informed traders will trade based on the expectation errors from partially informed traders.
Notice that partially informed traders will adjust their expectation of the fundamental value of the
underlying asset downward, i.e., b V 1
t − V 1
t < 0. From the persistence of the expectation error, fully
informed traders will believe E[(b V 1
t+1 − V 1
t+1)|F1,t] < 0. Thus, they will increase the holding of
the underlying asset in order to make proﬁt from the mistakes of the partially informed traders.
Therefore, fully informed traders trade against partially informed traders by trading in opposite
directions. In summary, we show that when PΘ < 0 and P∆ < 0, fully informed traders trade
against partially informed traders in order to proﬁt from the mistakes of the partially informed
31traders.
Proposition 8 If β<0, ρ>0 and 0 <k<1, trading amongst informed traders can happen. In
addition, in this case, PV < 0.
β<0 implies that noise traders are trend followers and ρ>0 implies that the price has a positive
autocorrelation coeﬃcient which matches the empirical observation of the ﬁnancial time series of
price. According to the Bucy-Kalman ﬁlter formula, k is the weight used in the belief updating.
A positive k suggests that new information and current belief both receive attention. As a result,
the partially informed traders adjust their belief in a wrong way when there is a positive shock in
supply.
A negative PV suggests that when there is a positive innovation in fundamental value of the
underlying asset, the price may decrease in response. This is ineﬃcient because such trading amongst
informed traders can prolong the procedure of information diﬀusion and thus the rate of information
diﬀusion is slower.
Proposition 8 characterizes one set of possible parameter values which can generate trading
amongst informed traders. That is, partially informed traders mistakenly adjust their beliefs in a
wrong way when they cannot distinguish the positive shock in supply from a decrease in fundamental
value of the underlying asset. If fully informed traders know that noise traders are trend followers
and partially informed traders make a mistake in adjusting their beliefs, they will trade against the
partially informed traders to make a proﬁt. This proﬁtable opportunity originates from the mistakes
made by the partially informed traders. This is ineﬃcient, because if that is the case, it leads to a
negative response of current market price to a positive innovation in the fundamental value of the
underlying asset. This distortion of price response is due to the informational arbitrage amongst
informed traders.
32IV. Numerical Analysis
In this section, we present a numerical study of the model. Using this numerical study, we
can show the statistical properties of equilibrium, namely, the price structure, and the return pre-
dictability. Second, we want to investigate the “beta eﬀect” and the “hierarchical eﬀect” and their
implications.
The parameters used in the simulation study are as follows. The probability of liquidation λ
is 5%, which corresponds to an expected lifespan of 20 periods. The risk-free rate r is 1%, which
corresponds to the annual yield on a treasury bill. The parameters that describe the fundamental
value of the underlying asset are chosen to match the volatility of returns at 12% and we set a =0 .85
and bV =0 .3. We vary the above parameters and ﬁnd that the diﬀerent sets of parameters do not
change the main results qualitatively.
A. Impact of Noise Traders
First, we study the eﬀects of noise traders’ behavior. We mainly study the behavior of noise
traders in the case of two information hierarchies and the case of three information hierarchies. For
the plots, to match the prices’ empirical behavior, we want to have a positive AR(1) coeﬃcient
that is close to 1. We choose β = −2 in the case of two information hierarchies and β = −20 in
the case of three information hierarchies. The Figure 1 shows a typical set of plots of price series,
return series, and persistent structure which is captured by autocorrelations of prices and returns.
It shows that the prices are persistent, and there is a ﬁrst order positive serial correlation with the
magnitude 0.8 in returns. There is a positive serial correlation in returns which suggests the existence
of momentum. Similar patterns can also be observed in the plot of the case of three information
hierarchies, although the ﬁrst order serial correlation in returns drops and returns become much less
persistent, which is a better approximation of the empirical behavior of returns. This decrease in
persistence structure in returns may be due to the existence of interactions between the informed
traders which diminishes the eﬀect of the persistent structure brought by the predictable pattern in
noise traders’ behavior. Thus, when there are more information hierarchies, the magnitude of the
33momentum eﬀect is smaller, as shown in Table II. The magnitude of the ﬁrst order autocorrelation
of returns decreases when the number of information hierarchies increases. Furthermore, Table
II indicates that the persistence structure in returns decreases when the number of information
hierarchies increases.
Table I shows that the simulation results for “beta eﬀect” in the case of three information
hierarchies. First column reports AR coeﬃcient of price series, ρ. It demonstrates that when the
magnitude of β increases, the AR coeﬃcient ρ decreases. Intuitively, when the size of noise trading
on a ﬁnancial market increases, the behavior of the market price is driven by the noise traders’
behavior. The forecasting behavior of informed traders which contribute to the persistence of price
in a diminishing manner. The second column reports the ﬁrst lag serial correlation in returns which
also suggests that the magnitude of “momentum eﬀect” decreases as the magnitude of β increases.
There is an ARCH eﬀect in returns which suggests the volatilityclustering of returns. Intuitively,
because there are potentially two equilibrium with two ρs, the switching from equilibrium can induce
the volatility clustering of returns. The persistence structure of squared returns decreases as the
magnitude of β increases as evidenced by the decrease in the reported sum of the autocorrelation
coeﬃcients of ﬁrst 10 lags of squared returns.
Deﬁne ∆t = b V 1
t − V 1
t . Table I reports the eﬀects of the predictable pattern of the noise traders
behavior. β become more negative implying that the noise traders trade more and more aggressively
as trend-followers.
The negative correlation between ∆t and Vt is interesting. It implies that when there is a
positive shock in the fundamental value of the underlying asset, the expectation is biased downward.
Therefore, the partially informed trader takes a fundamental risk. When noise traders trade more
and more aggressively, the partially informed trader takes more and more fundamental risk. The
seventh column shows that given the noise traders are trend-followers, they are right about price
direction. It is may be due to that the fully informed trader may ﬁnd out that it is not that
proﬁtable to trade with noise traders and he chooses to trade with the partially informed traders
using his own informational advantage. Notice that in our setting, it may be less risky to trade
34with the partially informed traders than with noise traders. Although there is predictable pattern in
noise traders’ behavior, it becomes increasingly risky when noise traders trade aggressively. Hence,
the fully informed trader instead chooses to exploit his informational advantage over the partially
informed traders.
The negative correlation between expectation errors and supply shocks is also consistent with
our intuition. Intuitively, if there is a positive shock in liquidity supply, the price will go down. The
partially informed trader cannot distinguish whether the drop in price is due to a negative shock in
fundamentals or a positive shock in supply. Hence, he adjusts his expectation downward.
The deviation of price from the fundamentals is increasing in β. When the magnitude of β
decreases, i.e, traders trade less aggressively, ρ increases. When ρ approaches 1, there is a sharp
increase in the deviation corresponding to a 98% increase in mean of price. It seems that as noise
traders trade less aggressively, the price becomes more persistent and the a bubble, i.e., the deviation
of market price from the fundamental value of the underlying asset, is generated.
B. Impacts of the Number of Hierarchies
We choose β = −20 for all values of N. Table II reports the eﬀects of the number of information
hierarchies. First thing to note is that the corresponding AR coeﬃcients of price monotonically
increase when N increases, implyingthat price becomes more persistent. Intuitively, if there are more
information hierarchies, the expectation errors from the signal extraction behavior of all partially
informed traders make the price more persistent. The weight of the past price in determining the
current price increases as more partially informed traders try to do signal extraction. Thus, the
current price is more correlated with the past price, i.e., the AR coeﬃcient for price increases.
The autocorrelation coeﬃcient of return decreases as the number of the information hierarchies
increases as we indicated earlier. To be consistent with the empirical ﬁnding, the number of infor-
mation hierarchies should be greater than 9, which generates a 0.1t o0 .2 autocorrelation coeﬃcient.
ARCH eﬀect exists in the returns as well. And the persistence structure of squared returns increases
as the number of information hierarchies increase.
35As shown in the last column of Table II, the slower information diﬀusion rate is captured by the
number of time periods it takes for the price to converge back to the long run equilibrium price. To
do this, we start with a positive supply shock with a magnitude 0.1 and set all Vts constant. Then
we examine the diﬀerence between the current price and the fundamental value of the underlying
asset. If the diﬀerence is suﬃciently small, the price converges to the fundamental value.11 Then
we report the number of periods for the price to converge. We can see clearly that as the number of
information hierarchies increases, it takes a longer time for price to converge back to the long run
fundamental value of the underlying asset. This provides simulation evidence of one of the main
results of the paper: As the number of information hierarchies increases, the information diﬀusion
is slower. A similar experiment is studied for the shock in the fundamental value of the underlying
asset, and a similar pattern is found.
V. Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a discrete time, inﬁnite time period model to understand the relation-
ship between hierarchical information and price discovery. The partially informed traders trade a
stock based on their signals and expectation of the signals received by fully informed traders. The
expectation errors from the signal extraction behavior of the partially informed traders is preserved
in the market price, which prevents the information from being released at the same rate as if there
was no hierarchical information among traders and the information was released instantaneously.
As the number of informational hierarchies increases, it becomes harder for the partially informed
traders to distinguish between the shock in fundamental value of the underlying asset and liquidity
shock brought about by noise traders. The slower price discovery process of the ﬁnancial market
can also be partly due to the fact that fully informed traders may prefer to trade with partially
informed traders. In order to make a proﬁt from the partially informed traders, the fully informed
trader should prevent the information disclosure and takes the opposite position of the partially
informed traders if they make large expectation errors. Therefore, this informational arbitrage leads
11In the simulation, we use 10−4 as a threshold level.
36to a slower information diﬀusion rate.
In addition, noise traders’ behavior is modeled with a predictable behavior pattern. This frame-
work yields a number of interesting ﬁndings. For instance, the predictable pattern of noise traders
brings the persistence structure in prices regardless of the statistical properties of the fundamentals
of the underlying asset. In addition, the predictable pattern of noise traders’ behavior can aid in
the formation of the momentum, i.e., the positive autocorrelation in returns.
One potentiallyinteresting avenue for future work is to endogenize the evolutionof the predictable
pattern of noise traders’ behavior. Doing so would allow us to determine the relationship between
the information diﬀusion and liquidity of the market. For instance, this extra uncertainty of the
predictable pattern in noise traders’ behavior may aﬀect the interactions among informed traders
and further aﬀect the information diﬀusion speed. Meanwhile, the evolution of the liquidity supply
of noise traders will aﬀect the market depth. This study may provide insights into the correlation
of market depth and information diﬀusion speed.




￿ ￿ Corr[Vt,∆t] Corr[Θt,∆t] Bubble
-11 0.995 0.753 0 1.879 -0.460 -0.508 0.670
-15 0.960 0.736 0 1.092 -0.541 -0.331 0.025
-20 0.922 0.723 0 0.964 -0.586 -0.213 0.010
-25 0.880 0.697 0 0.867 -0.607 -0.130 0.006
-30 0.833 0.657 0 0.775 -0.618 -0.068 0.003
-35 0.776 0.585 0 0.587 -0.624 -0.018 -0.001
-40 0.701 0.536 0 0.640 -0.626 -0.028 0.013
-45 0.594 0.488 0 0.506 -0.630 -0.069 0.003
Table I.: Effects of the predictable pattern of the noise traders’ behavior. The ﬁrst column reports the corresponding AR
coeﬃcient of the price series, ρ. The second column reports the ﬁrst lag serial correlation in returns. The third column reports the
P-value of the ARCH test with the H0: No ARCH eﬀects in returns for the ﬁrst 10 lags. The fourth column reports the sum of the
magnitudes of the autocorrelation function (ACF) coeﬃcients of the squared returns for the ﬁrst 10 lags. The ﬁfth column reports
the correlation between fundamental value and the expectation errors of the partially informed trader. The sixth column reports the
correlation between liquidity shocks and expectation errors from the partial informed trader. The seventh column reports the deviation
of price from the fundamental value discounted using a risk free rate and corrected for liquidity risk. The fundamental value of the
asset is deﬁned as λaVt
1+r−(1−λ)a. The equilibrium price without liquidity shocks is used for comparison with the purpose of isolating the
eﬀects of β. Formally, P
comparison
t = ρPt−1 − aλ
β
ρΩ +a(1−λ)
Vt + P∆(b V 1
t − V 1
t ).







5 0.859 0.692 0 0.797 7
6 0.895 0.490 0 0.855 11
7 0.920 0.301 0 1.282 18
9 0.939 0.208 0 1.578 29
10 0.952 0.154 0 1.848 32
14 0.987 0.113 0 2.978 36
15 0.992 0.109 0 2.156 39
Table II.: Effects of the increasing number of hierarchical information levels. β = −20 for all the cases. The ﬁrst column
reports the corresponding AR coeﬃcient of the price series, ρ. The second column reports the ﬁrst lag serial correlation in returns. The
third column reports the P-value of the ARCH test with the H0: No ARCH eﬀects in returns for the ﬁrst 10 lags. The fourth column
reports the sum of the magnitudes of the autocorrelation function (ACF) coeﬃcients of the squared returns for the ﬁrst 10 lags. The
ﬁfth column reports the number of time periods for the price to converge back to the stationary equilibrium price level given a positive
shock in supply of noise traders.
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(d) ACF of returns
Figure 1: Simulation results in two information hierarchies case. (a) Time series of simulated prices. (b)
Time series of simulated returns. (c) Time series of simulated variance of returns. (d) Average autocorrelations of
returns across 100 simulations.
39time











































































(d) ACF of returns
Figure 2: Simulation results in three information hierarchies case. (a) Time series of simulated prices. (b)
Time series of simulated returns. (c) Time series of simulated variance of returns. (d) Average autocorrelations of
returns across 100 simulations.
40Appendix 2.A: Proofs:
Proof to Proposition 1
It is straight forward to check that the proposition holds. Then we leave out for readers’ exercise.
Q.E.D
Proof to Proposition 2
If hierarchical information structure is assumed, the inﬁnite regress problem collapses. The iterated
expectations is reduced to b V 1
t = E[V 1
t |F2,t]. We restrict ourself to the linear rational expectation
equilibrium, where the price is a linear function takes the form of
Pt = ρPt−1 + PV Vt + PΘΘt + P∆(b V 1
t − V 1
t ) (30)
Given Equation 30, the demand for type 1 trader, the fully informed trader and the demand of type




t = ω2E[Qt+1|F2,t] (31)
Using Equation 30, we have
Qt+1 = λVt+1 +( 1− λ)Pt+1 − (1 + r)Pt
= λVt+1 +( 1− λ)(ρPt + PV Vt+1 + PΘΘt+1 + P∆(b V 1
t+1 − V 1
t+1)) − (1 + r)Pt
=( 1 − λ)ρPt +( λ +( 1− λ)PV )(aVt + bV ￿t)+( 1− λ)PΘΘt+1
+(1 − λ)P∆(b V 1
t+1 − V 1
t+1) − (1 + r)Pt (32)
Hence, we have
E[Qt+1|F2,t]=( ( 1 − λ)ρ − (1 + r))Pt +[ λ +( 1− λ)PV ]a[b V 1
t + V 2
t ]+( 1− λ)P∆(b V 1
t+1 − b V 1
t+1)
= ((1− λ)ρ − (1 + r))Pt +( λ +( 1− λ)PV )a(b V 1
t + V 2
t )
= ((1− λ)ρ − (1 + r))Pt +( λ +( 1− λ)PV )aVt +( λ +( 1− λ)PV )a(b V 1
t − V 1
t )
E[Qt+1|F1,t]=( ( 1 − λ)ρ − (1 + r))Pt +( λ +( 1− λ)PV )aVt +( 1− λ)P∆E[(b V 1
t+1 − V 1
t+1)|F1,t]
(33)
41Therefore, aggregate market demand is
X1
t + X2
t = Ω((1 − λ)ρ − (1 + r))Pt +( λ +( 1− λ)PV )aVt)
+(ω1(1 − λ)P∆E[b V 1
t+1 − V 1
t+1|F1,t]+ω2(λ +( 1− λ)PV )a(b V 1
t − V 1
t )
(34)
Market clearing condition implies that
βPt−1 +Θ t = Ω((1 − λ)ρ − (1 + r))Pt +( λ +( 1− λ)PV )aVt)
+(ω1(1 − λ)P∆E[b V 1
t+1 − V 1
t+1|F1,t]+ω2(λ +( 1− λ)PV )a(b V 1
t − V 1
t )
(35)
Matching coeﬃcients with Equation 30, we have
ρ =
β
Ω((1 − λ)ρ − (1 + r))
PV = −
aΩ(λ +( 1− λ)PV
Ω((1 − λ)ρ − (1 + r))
PΘ =
1
Ω((1 − λ)ρ − (1 + r))
(36)
Hence, we can solve all parameters except P∆ and they are










Now, we need to calculate P∆. In order to do that, we need to model the ﬁltering expectation
problem for type 2 trader explicitly. What type 2 trader can eﬀectively observe is (PV − P∆)V 1
t +
PΘΘt. He need to forecast V 1
t . It is essentially a ﬁlter problem. We set up the system as
V 1
t = aV 1
t−1 + bV ￿1
t
yt =( PV − P∆)V 1
t + PΘΘt
42Where ￿1
t is iid normal with mean 0 and variance 1 and Θt is iid normal with mean 0 and variance
σ2
Θ. Applying Kalman-Bucy ﬁlter12, we have
b V 1
t = a(1− k(PV − P∆))b V 1
t−1 + k(PV − P∆)V 1




Θa2(PV − P∆)k2 +( P 2
Θσ2
Θ(1 − a2)+b2
V (PV − P∆)2)k − b2
V (PV − P∆)=0
Let c =1− k(PV − P∆), we can rewrite Equation 38 into
b V 1
t − V 1
t = ac(b V 1
t−1 − V 1
t−1) − bV c￿1
t + kPΘΘt (39)
If we impose Equation 39 on the market clearing condition, we have
P∆ =
ω1ac(1 − λ)P∆ + ω2a(λ +( 1− λ)PV )
Ω((1 − λ)ρ − (1 + r)
(40)
Hence, we can solve for P∆ and c simultaneously
P∆ =












Θ(1 − c)(1 − a2c) − cb2
V (PV − P∆)2 =0
Q.E.D
Proof to Proposition 6
We only prove it when N = 4. The proof for N>4 is similar. First, we have two partially informed
traders, type 2 trader who knows V 2
t ,V3
t , and type 3 trader who only knows V 3
t . Notice that there
is only one instrument for them to ﬁlter the useful information for them, i.e., the market price of
the underlying asset. We conjecture the price to take form of:
Pt = ρPt−1 + PV Vt +
ρ
β
Θt + P∆1(b V 1
2,t − V 1
t )+P∆2(b V 1
3,t + b V 2
3,t − V 1
t − V 2
t ),
12See Jazwinski (1970) for a description.
43(42)
where b V 1
2,t = E[V 1
t |F2,t], b V 1
3,t = E[V 1
t |F3,t], b V 1
3,t = E[V 2
t |F3,t].







Using Equation 42, we have
Qt+1 = λVt+1 +( 1− λ)Pt+1 − (1 + r)Pt
= λVt+1 +( 1− λ)(ρPt + PVVt+1 + PΘΘt+1 + P∆1(b V 1
2,t+1 − V 1
t+1)
+P∆2(b V 1
3,t+1 + b V 2
3,t+1 − V 1
t+1 − V 2
t+1)) − (1 + r)Pt
= ((1 − λ)ρ − (1 + r))Pt +( λ +( 1− λ)PV )(aVt + bV ￿t)+( 1− λ)PΘΘt+1
+(1 − λ)(P∆1(b V 1
2,t+1 − V 1
t+1)+P∆2(b V 1
3,t+1 + b V 2
3,t+1 − V 1
t+1 − V 2
t+1) (43)
Hence, we have:
E[Qt+1|F3,t] = ((1 − λ)ρ − (1 + r))Pt +( λ +( 1− λ)PV )a(b V 1
3,t + b V 2
3,t + V 3
t )
+(1 − λ)P∆1(E[b V 1
2,t+1|F3,t]− b V 1
3,t+1)
= ((1 − λ)ρ − (1 + r))Pt +( λ +( 1− λ)PV )a(b V 1
3,t + b V 2
3,t + V 3
t )
= ((1 − λ)ρ − (1 + r))Pt +( λ +( 1− λ)PV )aVt +
(λ +( 1− λ)PV )a(b V 1
3,t+1 + b V 2
3,t+1 − V 1
t+1 − V 2
t+1)
E[Qt+1|F2,t] = ((1 − λ)ρ − (1 + r))Pt +( λ +( 1− λ)PV )a(b V 1
t + V 2
t + V 3
t )
+(1 − λ)P∆2E[(b V 1
3,t+1 + b V 2
3,t+1 − V 1
t+1 − V 2
t+1|F2,t)]
= ((1 − λ)ρ − (1 + r))Pt +( λ +( 1− λ)PV )aVt +( λ +( 1− λ)PV )a(b V 1
2,t − V 1
2,t)
44+(1 − λ)P∆2E[(b V 1
3,t+1 + b V 2
3,t+1 − V 1
t+1 − V 2
t+1|F2,t]
−(1 − λ)P∆2E[b V2,t+1 − V
1
t+1|F2,t]
E[Qt+1|F1,t] = ((1 − λ)ρ − (1 + r))Pt +( λ +( 1− λ)PV )aVt +( 1− λ)P∆1E[(b V 1
2,t+1 − V 1
t+1)|F1,t]
+(1 − λ)P∆2E[(b V
1







Imposing market clearing condition and match the coeﬃcients with Equation 42, we have:
ρ =
β
Ω((1 − λ)ρ − (1 + r))
PV = −
aΩ(λ +( 1− λ)PV
Ω((1 − λ)ρ − (1 + r))
PΘ =
1
Ω((1 − λ)ρ − (1 + r))
(45)
Hence, we can solve all parameters except P∆1 and P∆2 and they are:
0=( 1 − λ)Ωρ










Now, we need to calculate P∆1 and P∆2. In order to do that, we need to model the ﬁltering
expectation problem for type 2 trader and type 3 trader explicitly. What type 2 trader can eﬀectively
observe is (PV −P∆1 −P∆2)V 1
t +PΘΘt. And type 3 trader can eﬀectively observe (PV −P∆2)(V 1
t +
V 2
t )+P∆1(b V 1
2,t)+PΘΘt. Type 2 trader need to forecast V 1
t while type 3 trader need to forecast
V 1
t , V 2
t and b V 1
2,t. Notice that in hierarchical information structure, F3,t ⊂ F2,t. Therefore we have
E[E[V 1
t |F2,t]|F3,t]=E[V 1
t |F3,t]=b V 1
3,t which follows directly from law of iterated expectation.
45Next, let us write the ﬁlter problem for type 2 trader ﬁrst:
V 1
t = aV 1
t−1 + bV ￿1
t
yt =( PV − P∆1 − P∆2)V 1
t + PΘΘt
where ￿1
t is iid normal with mean 0 and variance 1 and Θt is iid normal with mean 0 and variance
σ2
Θ. Applying Kalman-Bucy ﬁlter, we have:
b V 1
t = a(1 − k(PV − P∆))b V 1
t−1 + k(PV − P∆)V 1















V (PV − P∆)
2)k − b
2
V (PV − P∆)=0
where P∆ = P∆1 + P∆2.
Let c =1− k(PV − P∆), we can rewrite Equation 47 into
b V 1
t − V 1
t = ac(b V 1
t−1 − V 1
t−1) − bV c￿1
t + kPΘΘt (48)





t + V 2
t
b V 1

















t−1 + V 2
t−1
b V 1






















The second line of Equation 49 means that type 3 trader do not make systematic expectation errors.
It implies that in equilibrium, type 3 trader can forecast the right parameter values which determine
the evolution process of the expectation errors for type 2 trader but not the errors themselves. If





3,t + b V 2
3,t
b V 1
















k1(PV − P∆2) k1P∆1
















3,t−1 + b V 2
3,t−1
b V 1









k1((PV − P∆2)(V 1
t + V 2
t )+P∆1(b V 1
2,t)+PΘΘt)
k2((PV − P∆2)(V 1
t + V 2





where k1 and k2 are parameters describe the weights used in ﬁltering. Notice that it is really
complicated to solve the parameters matrix directly. But we do not need to solve for the parameters
value for ﬁltering. We only need to describe the evolution of expectation errors of type 3 trader.
Notice that b V 1
3,t − b V 1






















k1(PV − P∆2) k1P∆1


























k1((PV − P∆2)(V 1
t + V 2
t )+P∆1(b V 1
2,t)+PΘΘt)
k2((PV − P∆2)(V 1
t + V 2







3,t + b V 2
3,t − V 1
t − V 2
t = a(1 − k1(PV − P∆2))(b V 1
3,t−1 + b V 2
3,t−1 − V 1
t−1 − V 2
t−1)+k1PΘΘt
+k1P∆1(b V 1
2,t − V 1




2,t − V 1
t )=a(PV − P∆2)(b V 1
3,t−1 + b V 2
3,t−1 − V 1
t−1 − V 2
t−1)
−bV (PV − P∆2(￿1
t + ￿2
t) − PΘΘt) (52)
Substitute the second line of Equation 52 into the ﬁrst line of Equation 52, we have
(b V 1
3,t + b V 2
3,t − V 1
t − V 2
t )=a(b V 1
3,t−1 + b V 2
3,t−1 − V 1
t−1 − V 2




Equation 48 and Equation 53 describe the evolution of expectation errors of type 2 trader and type
3 trader respectively. Using them with market clearing conditions, we have:
P∆2 =
aω3(λ +( 1− λ)PV )
−
β
ρ − a(ω1 + ω2)(1 − λ)
47P∆1 =
aω2(λ +( 1− λ)PV )) − ac(1 − λ)ω2P∆2
−
β












ρΩ − a(1 + λ)
− P∆1 − P∆2)
2 =0
Q.E.D
Proof to Proposition 8
From Proposition 2, PΘ =
ρ
β. Hence, if β<0 and ρ>0, PΘ < 0. PΘ < 0suggests that if there is a
positive shock in noise traders’ supply, price should decrease in response.
Then we only need to check the sign of P∆.
First, we prove that if P∆ < 0, then PV < 0. Suppose not, PV > 0.
From Proposition 2, PV = aλ
−
β
ρΩ−a(1−λ), the sign of PV is determined by the sign of −
β
ρΩ −a(1−λ).
To see this, if PV > 0, that is, −
β
ρΩ − a(1 − λ) > 0. We must have Ω(−
β
ρΩ − aω1
Ω (1 − λ)c) > 0 and
aω2(λ +( 1− λ)PV ) > 0. From Proposition 2, P∆ is
P∆ =
aω2(λ +( 1− λ)PV )
−
β
ρ − aω1(1 − λ)c
=




Ω (1 − λ)c]
(54)
Recall Ω = ω1 + ω2 and both ω1 and ω2 are positive. Hence, ω1
Ω < 1. Therefore, both numerator
and denominator are positive. Hence, P∆ > 0. That is, to have a P∆ < 0, PV should be negative.
If PV is negative, i.e., −
β
ρΩ − a(1 − λ) < 0.
There are two possible scenarios: ﬁrst, the numerator in Equation 54 is negative, i.e., if PV < − λ
1−λ.
The denominator of Equation 54, (−
β
ρΩ −aω1
Ω (1−λ)c), should be positive in order for P∆ < 0. That
is, aω1
Ω (1 − λ)c<−
β
ρΩ <a (1 − λ). Notice that this requires that ω1
Ω c<1. Because ω1
Ω < 1, it is
suﬃcient to have c<1. From the proof to Proposition 2, we know that 0 <k<1 can guarantee
0 <c<1.
48Second, the numerator in Equation 54 is positive, i.e., if 0 >P V > − λ








ρΩ − a(1 − λ)]
[−
β







ρΩ − a(1 − λ)][1− λ]
(55)
We know that β<0, ρ>0, Ω > 0 and λ>0. Hence, the numerator of Equation 55 is positive. For
the denominator, [−
β
ρΩ − a(1 − λ)] < 0 because of PV < 0 and [1 − λ] > 0. Thus, the denominator
of Equation 55 is negative. That is, PV + λ
1−λ < 0. In other word, (λ +( 1− λ)PV ) < 0. That is,
only the ﬁrst scenario is possible.
Q.E.D
Appendix 2.B
Derivation of Equation 5
In order to get Equation 5, we need to rewrite Equation 4 into






E[λVt+1 +( 1− λ)(Pt+1 − ρPt)]










E[λVt+1 +( 1− λ)Pt+1]









49The ﬁrst line implies that ∆ = −
β
ρω(1+r) and substitute it into second line. Then we have:
(1 − λ)ρ2 +( 1+r)ωρ + β =0 .
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